The assumption is that the American public, prompted by the antiwar section of the media, is having second thoughts about the wisdom of intervention in Iraq. Basing their strategy on that assumption, Arab radical groups of various ideological shades are mobilizing their resources in support of the terrorist campaign in Iraq.

A new coalition is emerging whose aim is not only to drive the United States out, but also to prevent the emergence of a democracy in Iraq. Diehard Saddamites, remnants of the pan-Arabist movement and various Islamist terrorist outfits, including some linked with Al Qaeda, form the new anti-democracy coalition in Iraq.

"Our aim is not only to drive the forces of occupation [out of Iraq]," reads a statement issued by the Ansar al-Sunnah (Victors of Sunnism), a group that claims to be behind some of the attacks against U.S. forces near Baghdad. "The real issue is to prevent the Americans from imposing [a system] on Iraq in which mortal men claim powers that belong to the Almighty."

It seems that President Bush understands "the real issue."

In his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy Thursday, Bush ignored the conjectural issues that dominate the Iraq debate and put the conflict in the broader context of the war that democracy has fought against despotism for over 2,500 years.

He presented intervention in Iraq as part of the same pattern of moral and military commitment that the United States, as a standard-bearer of democracy in the modern world, showed in helping rebuild and defend the democratic nations of post-war Western Europe, protecting them from Communism during the Cold War and combating Communism in Latin America, Europe and Asia.

The president made two important points.

The first is that the promotion of democracy is an imperative of U.S. national security. As long as there are despotic states that shelter, and often sponsor, terrorists, America will remain threatened in its own heartland.

The second is that it is impossible to turn Iraq into a lone democracy in a dangerous neighborhood of despotic and predatory regimes. Such an Iraq would have to devote the lion's share of its resources to developing a military machine to discourage bullying and/or direct attack by some of those neighbors. That would, in turn, throw the economy off balance, tempt the military to intervene in politics and lead to the return of the "moustaches" to power, albeit in a lighter version.

For Iraq to become a stable democracy, it is imperative that other nations in the region also embark on democratization.

Bush is right in saying that Muslims are no less entitled to freedom from despotism than the nations liberated from Fascism and Communism.

He is also right in asserting that different countries could be guided toward democracy in different ways. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was an exception because he had destroyed all internal mechanisms for reform. This is not the case in most other Middle Eastern nations that suffer under undemocratic regimes.

In other words, there is no need for direct U.S. military intervention to break the logjam created by systems that belong to another age.

WITHOUT practical policies to speed up democratization in the Middle East, however, this new "Bush Doctrine" will remain a pious hope. To translate his vision into realities on the ground, the president must make a number of moves.

To start with, he must unite his administration behind a Middle East policy that puts democratization at the top of the agenda. This is not now the case.

The State Department is still obsessed with the status quo and the dream of secret deals with Tehran and Damascus. It also shies away from anything that might offend Saudi and Egyptian governments.

The Pentagon, for its part, is so focused on the military aspects of the transition in Iraq that, despite Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's intellectual input, it often loses sight of the political aspects of the president's grander strategy.

The next move should be a reassessment of relations with the nations of the region. These can be divided into three groups:

* Friends of America who have embarked upon democratization. Mauritania, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman fall into this category. None could be described as a proper democracy. But each in its own way is engaged in a process that could, in time, produce an acceptable democratic system.

The United States must deepen relations with nations in this group, both individually and collectively, and press for speedier reform.

* Countries whose ruling elites profess U.S. friendship while their policies provoke or even encourage anti-Americanism. These include Tunisia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There are genuine constituencies for democratization in all three, including inside the ruling elites.

The United States should identify those constituencies, establish working relations with them, and cancel the blank checks it had had to sign during the Cold War.

* Countries whose regimes regard America as their strategic enemy, while the people are sympathetic to American values as they perceive them. The Sudan, Libya, Syria and Iran fall into this category.

These regimes must be treated as pariahs, with the United States and its allies throwing their moral and political support behind pro-democracy opposition movements.

We have left three countries out. One is Turkey, a developing democracy and longterm U.S. ally. Another is Algeria, where pro-democracy forces are strong but have virtually no contact with the United States. The third is Lebanon which, once it shakes off the Syrian military presence, would join the group of developing democracies in the region.

Next, the United States should promote a diplomatic process aimed at committing the nations of the region to a system of values and a set of rules in the conduct of both domestic and foreign policies.

Those that enter the process and sign accords, similar to the Helsinki Accords between the West and the Communist bloc in the final phase of the Cold War, would receive greater diplomatic deference, economic aid, preferential trade agreements, and the privilege of political consultation on regional affairs.

Those that do not will be isolated, subjected to political, cultural and economic sanctions - and, when necessary, faced with credible military pressure.

IRAQ is but one piece, albeit an important one, in a jigsaw puzzle that, when completed, would produce a Middle East committed to new system of governance based on the rule of law, human rights, pluralistic politics and an enterprise-based economy.

That would free over 300 million Muslims from tyranny, terror and poverty - and also enhance America's security. This is a cause worth fighting for.

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