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AROUND
1830, a group of French artists and intellectuals looked
around and noticed that people who were their spiritual
inferiors were running the world. Suddenly a large crowd of
merchants, managers, and traders were making lots of money,
living in the big houses, and holding the key posts. They had
none of the high style of the aristocracy, or even the earthy
integrity of the peasants. Instead, they were gross. They were
vulgar materialists, shallow conformists, and self-absorbed
philistines, who half the time failed even to acknowledge
their moral and spiritual inferiority to the artists and
intellectuals. What's more, it was their very mediocrity that
accounted for their success. Through some screw-up in the
great scheme of the universe, their narrow-minded greed had
brought them vast wealth, unstoppable power, and growing
social prestige.
Naturally, the artists and
intellectuals were outraged. Hatred of the bourgeoisie became
the official emotion of the French intelligentsia. Stendhal
said traders and merchants made him want to "weep and vomit at
the same time." Flaubert thought they were "plodding and
avaricious." Hatred of the bourgeoisie, he wrote, "is the
beginning of all virtue." He signed his letters
"Bourgeoisophobus" to show how much he despised "stupid
grocers and their ilk."
Of all the great creeds of the
19th century, pretty much the only one still thriving is this
one, bourgeoisophobia. Marxism is dead. Freudianism is dead.
Social Darwinism is dead, along with all those theories about
racial purity that grew up around it. But the emotions and
reactions that Flaubert, Stendhal, and all the others
articulated in the 1830s are still with us, bigger than ever.
In fact, bourgeoisophobia, which has flowered variously and
spread to places as diverse as Baghdad, Ramallah, and Beijing,
is the major reactionary creed of our age.
This is
because today, in much of the world's eyes, two peoples--the
Americans and the Jews--have emerged as the great exemplars of
undeserved success. Americans and Israelis, in this view, are
the money-mad molochs of the earth, the vulgarizers of morals,
corrupters of culture, and proselytizers of idolatrous values.
These two nations, it is said, practice conquest capitalism,
overrunning poorer nations and exploiting weaker neighbors in
their endless desire for more and more. These two peoples, the
Americans and the Jews, in the view of the bourgeoisophobes,
thrive precisely because they are spiritually stunted. It is
their obliviousness to the holy things in life, their feverish
energy, their injustice, their shallow pursuit of power and
gain, that allow them to build fortunes, construct weapons,
and play the role of hyperpower.
And so just as the
French intellectuals of the 1830s rose up to despise the
traders and bankers, certain people today rise up to shock,
humiliate, and dream of destroying America and Israel. Today's
bourgeoisophobes burn with the same sense of unjust
inferiority. They experience the same humiliation because
there is nothing they can do to thwart the growing might of
their enemies. They rage and rage. Only today's
bourgeoisophobes are not just artists and intellectuals. They
are as likely to be terrorists and suicide bombers. They teach
in madrassas, where they are careful not to instruct their
students in the sort of practical knowledge that dominates
bourgeois schools. They are Muslim clerics who incite hatred
and violence. They are erudite Europeans who burn with
humiliation because they know, deep down, that both America
and Israel possess a vitality and heroism that their nations
once had but no longer do.
Today the battle lines are
forming. The dispute over Palestine, which was once a local
conflict about land, has been transformed into a great
cultural showdown. The vast array of bourgeoisophobes--Yasser
Arafat's guerrilla socialists, Hamas's Islamic
fundamentalists, Jose Bove's anti-globalist leftists,
America's anti-colonial multiculturalists, and the BBC's
Oxbridge mediacrats--focus their diverse rages and resentments
on this one conflict.
The bourgeoisophobes have no
politburo. There is no bourgeoisophobe central command. They
have no plausible strategy for victory. They have only their
nihilistic rage, their envy mixed with snobbery, their snide
remarks, their newspaper distortions, their conspiracy
theories, their suicide bombs and terror attacks--and above
all, a burning sense that the rising, vibrant, and powerful
peoples of America and Israel must be humiliated and brought
low.
BOURGEOISOPHOBIA is really a hatred of
success. It is a hatred held by people who feel they are
spiritually superior but who find themselves economically,
politically, and socially outranked. They conclude that the
world is diseased, that it rewards the wrong values, the wrong
people, and the wrong abilities. They become cynical if they
are soft inside, violent if they are hard. In the
bourgeoisophobe's mind, the people and nations that do succeed
are not just slightly vulgar, not just over-compensated, not
just undeservedly lucky. They are monsters, non-human beasts
who, in extreme cases, can be blamelessly killed. This
Manichaean divide between the successful, who are hideous, and
the bourgeoisophobes, who are spiritually pristine, was
established early in the emergence of the creed. The early
19th-century German poet Holderlin couldn't just ignore the
merchant bourgeoisie; he had to declare the middle classes
"deeply incapable of every divine emotion." In other words,
scarcely human.
Holderlin's countryman Werner Sombart
later wrote a quintessential bourgeoisophobe text called
"Traders and Heroes," in which he argued that there are two
basic human types: "The trader approaches life with the
question, what can you give me? . . . The hero approaches life
with the question what can I give you?" The trader, then, is
the selfish capitalist who lives a meager, artificial life
amidst "pocket-watches, newspapers, umbrellas, books, sewage
disposal, politics." The hero is the total man, who is
selfless, vital, spiritual, and free. An honest person might
ascribe another's success to a superior work ethic,
self-discipline, or luck--just being in the right place at the
right time and possessing the right skills. A normal person
might look at a rich and powerful country and try to locate
the source of its vitality, to measure its human and natural
resources, its freedom, its institutions and social norms. But
for the bourgeoisophobe, other people's success is never
legitimate or deserved. To him, success comes to those who
worship the golden calf, the idol, the Satanic corrupter,
gold.
When bourgeoisophobes describe their enemies,
they almost always portray them as money-mad, as crazed
commercialists. And this vulgar materialism, in their view,
has not only corrupted the soul of the bourgeoisie, but
through them threatens to debase civilization itself and the
whole world. It threatens, in the words of the supreme
bourgeoisophobe, Karl Marx, to take all that is holy and make
it profane.
Some of the more pessimistic
bourgeoisophobes come to believe that the worst is already at
hand. "Our poor country lies in Roman decadence," the French
conservative poet Arthur de Gobineau lamented in 1840. "We are
without fiber or moral energy. I no longer believe in
anything. . . . MONEY HAS KILLED EVERYTHING." (A great place
to read bourgeoisophobe writing is Arthur Herman's "The Idea
of Decline in Western History." Bourgeoisophobia is not
Herman's theme, but his book does such a magnificent job of
surveying two centuries of pessimistic thought that most of
the key bourgeoisophobes are quoted.)
And once the
bourgeoisophobes had experienced the basic spasm of reaction,
they soon settled on the Americans and Jews as two of the
chief objects of their ire. Because, as Henry Steele Commager
once noted, no country in the world ever succeeded like
America, and everybody knew it. And no people in the European
experience ever achieved such sustained success as the Jews.
So the Jews were quickly established in the
bourgeoisophobe imagination as the ultimate commercial people.
They were the bankers, the traders, the soulless and sharp
dealmakers who crawled through the cellars of honest and noble
cultures and infected them with their habits and practices.
The 19th-century Teutonic philosopher Houston Chamberlain said
of the Jews that "their existence is a crime against the holy
laws of life." The Jewish religion, he said, is "rigid,"
"scanty," and "sterile."
The American bourgeoisophobe
family, the Adamses, contained more than its share of
anti-Semites. Brooks Adams lamented that "England is as much
governed by the Jews of Berlin, Paris and New York as the
native growth." Adams compared the Jews to a vast syndicate
and declared simply, "They control the world." Henry Adams
protested against the interlocked power of "Wall Street, State
Street and Jerusalem." Later, the English historian Arnold
Toynbee argued that the Jews, with their "consummate
virtuosity in commerce and finance," had infected Western
civilization with a crass materialism. Through their arrogance
and viciousness, they were responsible for capitalism, godless
communism, and the Holocaust, and so had contributed to
Europe's decline.
It's actually amazing how early
America, too, was stereotyped as a money-grubbing commercial
land and Americans a money-grubbing people. Francois La
Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, who traveled in the United States in
the 1790s, declared, "The desire for riches is their ruling
passion." In 1805, a British visitor observed, "All men there
make [money] their pursuit." "Gain! Gain! Gain! Gain! Gain!"
is how the English philosopher Morris Birbeck summarized the
American spirit a few years later. In 1823 William Faux wrote
that "two selfish gods, pleasure and gain, enslave the
Americans." Fourteen years after that, the disillusioned
Russian writer Mikhail Pogodin lamented, "America, on which
our contemporaries have pinned their hopes for a time, has
meanwhile clearly revealed the vices of her illegitimate
birth. She is not a state, but rather a trading company."
Each wave of foreign observers reinforced the
prejudice. Charles Dickens described a country of uncouth
vulgarians frantically chasing, as he first put it, "the
almighty dollar." Oswald Spengler worried that Germany would
devolve into "soulless America," with its worship of
"technical skill, money and an eye for facts." Matthew Arnold
worried that global forces would Americanize England. "They
will rule [Britain] by their energy but they will deteriorate
it by their low ideas and want of culture." By 1904, people
around the world were worrying about American cultural
hegemony. In that year the German writer Paul Dehns wrote an
influential essay called "The Americanization of the World."
"What is Americanization?" Dehns asked. "Americanization in
its widest sense, including the societal and political, means
the uninterrupted, exclusive, and relentless striving after
gain, riches and influence."
In the 20th century the
Americans' aggressive commercialism was symbolized by the
unstoppable spread of jeans, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, Disney,
and Microsoft. America, in the bourgeoisophobes' eyes, is the
land of Bart Simpson, boy bands, boob jobs, and "Baywatch."
The land of money and guns. Of insincere smiles and love
handles. So by the time Osama bin Laden came along, hatred of
America was well rehearsed, a finished product just waiting
for him to pick it up. In 1998 bin Laden declared war on "the
crusader-Jewish alliance, led by the United States and
Israel." He added, "Since I was a boy I have been at war with
and harboring hatred towards the Americans." He was only
echoing Toynbee, who 30 years earlier said, "The United States
and Israel must be today the two most dangerous of the 125
sovereign states among which the land surface of this planet
is at present partitioned."
FOR THE
bourgeoisophobe, then, the question becomes, how does one
confront this menace? And on this, the bourgeoisophobes split
into two schools. One, which might be called the brutalist
school, seeks to reclaim the raw, masculine vitality that
still lies buried at the virile heart of human nature. The
other, which might be called the ethereal school, holds that a
creative minority can rise above prosaic bourgeois life into a
realm of contemplation, feeling, art, sensibility, and
spiritual grace.
The brutalist school started in
Germany, more or less with Nietzsche. In "Thus Spake
Zarathustra," Nietzsche has a character declare that he is
turning his back on the whole world of degenerate
"flea-beetles," the ones who spend their lives "higgling and
haggling for power with the rabble." Salvation instead is
found in the will to power. The Ubermensch possesses force of
will. He can thus be "a mighty . . . hammer" who will smash,
"break and remove degenerate and decaying races to make way
for a new order of life."
The brutalists urged
sons--"the explosive ones"--to revolt against their fathers.
They romanticized insanity as a rebellion against convention.
They looked back nostalgically to the crude, savage, and proud
men of Homeric legend, Germanic history, and Norse myth. They
looked for another such hero to emerge today, a virile warrior
who would demolish the stale encrustations of an overcivilized
world and revive the raw energy of the species. "We do not
need ideologues anymore," Oswald Spengler argued, "we need
hardness, we need fearless skepticism, we need a class of
socialist master men." This, of course, was the path that led
to Mussolini, Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and bin Laden.
Meanwhile, the ethereal bourgeoisophobes were emerging
in Paris and later London and the United States. They argued
that people in decaying cultures should not try to reclaim
their former economic and military power. It was wiser to
accept the decline of their worldly power and embrace the
contemplative virtues. Toynbee acknowledged that Europe's
virile, self-assertive days were over. Europeans would have to
choose between spending their money on comfortable welfare
states and spending it on militaristic "war-making states."
They could not afford both. He predicted (in 1926) that they
would choose welfare states--and be forced to accept being
"dwarfed by the overseas world which [Europe] herself had
called into existence."
The Europeans should therefore
turn inward. As Arthur Herman notes, the human ideal Toynbee
described looks a lot like Toynbee himself: "diffident,
sensitive, religious in a contemplative and otherworldly
sense, a man who shuns the world of violence and barbarism to
pursue the 'etherealization' of himself and society." Toynbee
denounced patriotism, commercial striving, and the martial
spirit. Artists and intellectuals, the "creative minority,"
should lead until "the majority is drilled into following the
minority's lead mechanically."
Though Toynbee despised
the United States, his books sold well here. His lecture tours
were lucrative, and his picture was on the cover of Time
magazine. When Hitler came along, Toynbee was an enthusiastic
appeaser. He met Hitler in 1936 and came away deeply impressed
(the two men hated some of the same things). He told his
countrymen that Hitler sincerely desired peace. For, just as
the brutalist school of bourgeoisophobia led to Hitler and
Saddam, the ethereal school led to Neville Chamberlain and
some of the European reaction to George Bush's Axis of Evil.
SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, there has been a great
deal of analysis of the roots of Muslim rage. But to anybody
familiar with the history of bourgeoisophobia, it is striking
how comfortably Muslim rage meshes with traditional rage
against meritocratic capitalism. The Islamist fanatic and the
bourgeoisophobe hate the same things. They use the same words,
they utter the same protests. In an essay in the New York
Review of Books called "Occidentalism," Avishai Margalit and
Ian Buruma listed the traits that enrage al Qaeda and other
Third World anti-Americans and anti-Westerners. First, they
hate the city. Cities stand for commerce, mixed populations,
artistic freedom, and sexual license. Second, they hate the
mass media: advertising, television, pop music, and videos.
Third, they hate science and technology--the progress of
technical reason, mechanical efficiency, and material
know-how. Fourth, they hate prudence, the desire to live
safely rather than court death and heroically flirt with
violence. Fifth, they hate liberty, the freedom extended even
to mediocre people. Sixth, they despise the emancipation of
women. As Margalit and Buruma note, "Female emancipation leads
to bourgeois decadence." Women are supposed to stay home and
breed heroic men. When women go out into the world, they
deprive men of their manhood and weaken their virility.
If you put these six traits together, you have pretty
much the pillars of meritocratic capitalist society, practiced
most assertively in countries like America and Israel.
Contemporary Muslim rage is further inflamed by two additional
passions. One is a sense of sexual shame. A rite of passage
for any bourgeoisophobe of this type is the youthful trip to
America or to the West, where the writer is nearly seduced by
the vulgar hedonism of capitalist life, but heroically spurns
it. Sayyid Qutb, who is one of the intellectual heroes of the
Islamic extremists, toured America between 1948 and 1950. He
found a world of jazz, football, movies, cars, and people
obsessed with lawn maintenance. It was a land, he wrote,
"hollow and full of contradictions, defects and evils." At one
point Qutb found himself at a church social. The disc jockey
put on "Baby, It's Cold Outside." As Qutb wrote, "The dancing
intensified. . . . The hall swarmed with legs. . . . Arms
circled arms, lips met lips, chests met chests, and the
atmosphere was full of love." This was at a church social. You
can imagine how the September 11 al Qaeda hijackers must have
felt during the visit they made to a Florida strip club
shortly before going off to their purifying martyrdom.
The second inflaming passion is
humiliation--humiliation caused by the fact that in the 1960s
and 1970s, many Arab and Muslim nations tried to join this
bourgeois world. They tried to modernize, and they failed.
Some Arab countries continue to pursue the low and dirty
modernizing path, continue to ape the sordid commercialists
and even to accept the presence of American troops on Arabian
soil. And this drives the hard-core Islamic bourgeoisophobes
to even higher states of rage. As bin Laden himself notably
put it, protesting the presence of American troops on Saudi
land: "By God, Muslim women refuse to be defended by these
American and Jewish prostitutes." The Islamist response to
humiliation has been worship of the Muslim man of force.
Islamist extremists romanticize the brutal warrior, just as
the German bourgeoisophobes did, only the Islamists wear robes
and clutch Korans. Like European and Japanese brutalists
before them, the Islamists celebrate violence and build a cult
of suicide and death. "The Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we love
death," declared al Qaeda's Mualana Inyadullah after
September11. Jews "love life more than any other people, and
they prefer not to die," declared Hamas official Ismail Haniya
on March 28 amidst a rash of suicide bombings.
THE BRUTALIST bourgeoisophobia of the Islamic extremists is
pretty straightforward. The attitudes of European etherealists
are quite a bit more complicated. Europeans, of course, are
bourgeois themselves, even more so in some ways than Americans
and Israelis. What they distrust about America and Israel is
that these countries represent a particularly aggressive and,
to them, unbalanced strain of bourgeois ambition. No European
would ever acknowledge the category, but America and Israel
are heroic bourgeois nations. The Israelis are driven by
passionate Zionism to build their homeland and make it rich
and powerful. Americans are driven by our Puritan sense of
calling, the deeply held belief that we Americans have a
special mission to spread our way of life around the globe. It
is precisely this heroic element of ordinary life that
Europeans lack and distrust.
So the Europeans are all ambivalence. The British historian
J.H. Plumb once declared that he loved America (and he was
indeed a great defender of the United States), but even his
admiration for the country "was entangled with anger, anxiety
and at times flashes of hate." In his infuriatingly
condescending and ultimately appreciative portrait "America,"
the French modernist Jean Baudrillard wrote, "America is
powerful and original; America is violent and abominable. We
should not seek to deny either of these aspects, nor reconcile
them."
But Europeans do seek to deny them--because they simply can't
remember what it's like to be imperially confident, to feel
the forces of history blowing at one's back, to have heroic
and even eschatological aspirations. Their passions have been
quieted. Their intellectual guides have taught them that
business is ignoble and striving is vulgar. Their history has
caused them to renounce military valor (good thing, too) and
to regard their own relative decline as a sign of greater
maturity and wisdom. The European Union has a larger
population than the United States, and a larger GDP--and its
political class has tried to construct an institutional
architecture that will enable it to rival America. But the
imperial confidence is gone, along with the youthful sense of
limitless possibility and the unselfconscious embrace of
ordinary striving.
So their internal engine is calibrated differently. They look
with disdain upon our work ethic (the average American works
350 hours a year--nearly nine weeks--longer than the average
European). They look with disdain upon what they see as our
lack of social services, our relatively small welfare state,
which rewards mobility and effort but less gracefully cushions
misfortune. They look with distaste upon our commercial
culture, which favors the consumer but does not ease the
rigors of competition for producers. And they look with fear
upon our popular culture, which like some relentless machine
seems designed to crush the local cultures that stand in its
way.
To European bourgeoisophobes, America is the radioactive core
of what Ignacio Ramonet, editor and publisher of Le Monde
Diplomatique, recently called "The Other Axis of Evil" in a
front-page essay. It controls the IMF and the World Bank, the
institutions that reward the rich and punish the poor, Ramonet
claimed. American institutions such as the Heritage
Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Cato
Institute promulgate the ideology that justifies exploitation,
he continued. The American military provides the muscle to
force-feed economic liberalism to the world.
They look at us uncomprehendingly when our leaders declare a
global assault on terror and evil. They see us as a mindless
Rambo, a Mike Tyson with rippling muscles and no brain. Where
the Islamists see us as a decadent slut, the European
etherealists see us as a gun-slinging cowboy. The Islamists
think we are too spoiled and comfortable, the Europeans think
we are too violent and impulsive. Each side's view of us is a
mix of Hollywood images (Marilyn Monroe for the Islamists,
John Wayne for the Europeans), mass-media distortions,
envy-driven stereotypes, and self-justifying delusions. But
each side's vision springs from a deeper bourgeoisophobia--the
prejudice that people who succeed in worldly affairs must be
morally and intellectually backward. This article of faith
governs the way even many sophisticated Europeans and Muslims
react to us.
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, there was a widespread fear in Europe and
in certain American circles that the United States would lash
out violently and pointlessly. In fact, the United States has
never behaved this way. It was slow to respond to Pearl
Harbor; it was too timid in its responses to the USS Cole and
other attacks. But to many Europeans, who must believe in our
mindless immaturity in order to look themselves in the mirror
each morning, it was obvious that the United States would
shoot first and think afterwards.
These Europeans have assigned themselves the self-flattering
role of being Athens to our Rome. That's what all the talk
about coalition-building is about; the mindless American car
dealer with the big guns should allow himself to be guided by
the thoughtful European statesman, who is better able to think
through the unintended consequences of any action, and to
understand the darker complexities. Much European commentary
about America since September 11 has had a zoological tone.
The American beast did not know that he was vulnerable to
attack (we Europeans have long understood this). The American
was traumatized by this discovery. The American was
overcompensating with an arms build-up that was pointless
since, with his gigantisme militaire, he already had more
weapons than he could ever need.
Furthermore, the American doesn't see the deeper causes of
terrorism, the poverty, the hopelessness. America should
really be spending more money on foreign aid (it's interesting
that Europeans, who are supposed to be less materialistic than
we are, inevitably think more money can solve the world's
problems, while Americans tend to point to religion or ideas).
"What America never takes a moment to consider is that,
despite its mightiness, it is a young country with much to
learn. It had no real direct experience of the First and
Second World Wars," declared a writer in the New Statesman,
echoing a sentiment that one heard across the Continent as
well. America, many Europeans feel, has no experience with the
Red Brigades, the IRA, the Basque terrorists. Americans have
no experience with Afghanistan. The dim boobies have no idea
what sort of instability they are about to cause. They will go
marching off as they always do, naively confident of
themselves, yet inevitably unaware of the harm they shall do.
Much of the reaction, in short, has been straight out of
Graham Greene's novel "The Quiet American." The hero of that
book, Alden Pyle, is a well-intentioned, naive, earnest
manchild who dreams of spreading democracy but only stirs up
chaos. "I never knew a man who had better motives for all the
trouble he caused," one of the characters says about him. Much
of the European intellectual response to the American war has
less to do with actual evidence than with figures from
literature and the mass media. Sometimes you get the
impression that the only people who took the images of Rambo,
the Lone Ranger, and Superman seriously were the European
bourgeoisophobes who needed cliches to hate.
When the etherealized bourgeoisophobe goes to practice
politics, he instinctively dons the pinstripes of the
diplomat. Diplomacy fits his temperament. It demands subtlety
instead of clarity, self-control instead of power, patience
instead of energy, nuance instead of restlessness. Diplomacy
is highly formal, highly elitist, highly civilized. Most of
all, it is complex. Complexity is catnip to the etherealized
bourgeoisophobe. It paralyzes brute action, and justifies
subtle and basically immobile gestures, calibrations, and
modalities. Bourgeoisophobes have a simple-minded faith that
whatever the problem is, the solution requires complexity. Any
decisive effort to change the status quo--to topple Saddam, to
give up on Arafat, to foment democracy in the Arab world--will
only make things worse.
We Americans have our own bourgeoisophobes, of course. If I
pulled from my shelves all the books about the moral
backwardness of the enterprising middle classes, I could stack
them to the ceiling. I could start with the works of the
Transcendentalists, then move through Dreiser, Mencken,
Sherwood Anderson, and Sinclair Lewis. Then we could skim
swiftly through all the books that bemoan the moral, cultural,
and intellectual vapidity of suburbanites, students, middle
managers, and middle Americans: "Babbitt," "The Man in the
Gray Flannel Suit," "The Souls of Black Folk," "The Lonely
Crowd," "The Organization Man," "The Catcher in the Rye," "The
Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," "The Affluent
Society," "Death of a Salesman," "Soul on Ice," "The Culture
of Narcissism," "Habits of the Heart," "The Closing of the
American Mind," "Earth in the Balance," "Slouching Towards
Gomorrah," "Jihad vs. McWorld," just about every word ever
written by Kevin Phillips and Michael Moore, and just about
every novel of the last quarter century, from "Rabbit is Rich"
through "The Corrections." It's a Mississippi flood of
pessimism. As Catherine Jurca recently wrote in "White
Diaspora: The Suburb and the Twentieth-Century American
Novel," "As a body of work, the suburban novel asserts that
one unhappy family is a lot like the next, and there is no
such thing as a happy family."
The pessimism falls into several categories. There is
straightforward, left-wing bourgeoisophobia from writers who
think commercial culture has ravaged our souls. Then there is
the right-wing variant that says it has made us spiritually
flat, and so turned us into comfort-loving Last Men. Then
there is the conservative pessimism that purports to be a
defense of the heroic bourgeois culture America embodies while
actually showing little faith in it. Writers of this school
argue that the solid capitalist values America once possessed
have been corrupted by intellectual currents coming out of the
universities--as if the meritocratic capitalist virtues were
such delicate flowers that they could be dissolved by the acid
influence of Paul de Man.
It all adds up to a lot of dark foreboding, and after
September 11, it doesn't look that impressive. The events of
the past several months have cast doubt on a century of mostly
bourgeoisophobe cultural pessimism. Somehow the firemen in New
York and the passengers on Flight 93 behaved like heroes even
though they no doubt lived in bourgeois homes, liked Oprah,
shopped at Wal-Mart, watched MTV, enjoyed their Barcaloungers,
and occasionally glanced through Playboy. Even more than that,
it has become abundantly clear since September 11 that America
has ascended to unprecedented economic and military heights,
and it really is not easy to explain how a country so corrupt
to the core can remain for so long so apparently successful on
the surface. If we're so rotten, how can we be so great?
It could be, as the bourgeoisophobes say, that America thrives
because it is spiritually stunted. It's hard to know, since
most of us lack the soul-o-meter by which the cultural
pessimists apparently measure the depth of other people's
souls. But we do know that despite the alleged savagery,
decadence, and materialism of American life, Americans still
continue to react to events in ways that suggest there is more
to this country than "Survivor," Self magazine, and T.G.I.
Friday's.
Confronted with the events of September 11, Americans have not
sought to retreat as soon as possible to the easy comfort of
their great-rooms (on the contrary, it's been others around
the world who have sought to close the parenthesis on these
events). President Bush, a man derided as a typical philistine
cowboy, has framed the challenge in the most ambitious
possible terms: as a moral confrontation with an Axis of Evil.
He has chosen the most arduous course. And the American people
have supported him, embraced his vision every step of the
way--even the people who fiercely opposed his election.
This is not the predictable reaction of a decadent, commercial
people. This is not the reaction you would have predicted if
you had based your knowledge of America on the extensive
literature of cultural decline. Nor would you have been able
to predict the American reaction to recent events in the
Middle East, which also differs markedly from the European
one. Just as the French anti-globalist activist Jose Bove,
heretofore most famous for smashing up a McDonald's, senses
that he has something in common with Yasser Arafat (whom he
visited in Ramallah on March 31), most Americans sense that
they have something in common with Israel in this fight. Most
Americans can see the difference between nihilistic terrorism
and a democracy trying fitfully to defend itself. And most
Americans seem willing to defend the principles that are at
stake here, even in the face of global criticism and obloquy.
In this, as in so much else, George Bush reflects the
meritocratic capitalist culture of which he is a product.
While the rest of the world was lost in a moral fog, going on
about the "cycle of violence" as if bombs set themselves off
and the language of human agency and moral judgment didn't
apply, the Bush administration, by and large, has been clear.
IN THIS and many other aspects of the war on terrorism, the
American leaders and the American people have been stubborn
and steadfast. Just as the American people patiently
persevered through a century of fighting fascism and
communism, there is every sign they will patiently persevere
in the conflict against terrorism, which is really a struggle
against people who despise our way of life.
Maybe the bourgeoisophobes were wrong from the first. Maybe
they were wrong to think that 90 percent of humanity is mad to
seek money. Maybe they were wrong to think that wealth
inevitably corrupts. Maybe they were wrong to regard
themselves as the spiritual superiors of middle-class bankers,
lawyers, and traders. Maybe they were wrong to think that
America is predominantly about gain and the bitch-goddess
success. Maybe they were wrong to think that power and wealth
are a sign of spiritual stuntedness. Maybe they were wrong to
treasure the ecstatic gestures of rebellion, martyrdom, and
liberation over the deeper satisfactions of ordinary life.
And if they weren't wrong, how does one explain the fact that
almost all their predictions turned out to be false? For two
centuries America has been on the verge of exhaustion or
collapse, but it never has been exhausted or collapsed. For
two centuries capitalism has been in crisis, but it never has
succumbed. For two centuries the youth/the artists/the
workers/the oppressed minorities were going to overthrow the
staid conformism of the suburbs, but in the end they never
did. Instead they moved to the suburbs and found happiness
there.
For two centuries there has been this relentless pattern. Some
new bourgeoisophobe movement or figure emerges--Lenin, Hitler,
Sartre, Che Guevara, Woodstock, the Sandinistas, Arafat. The
new movement is embraced. It is romanticized. It is heralded
as the wave of the future. But then it collapses, and the
never-finally-disillusioned bourgeoisophobes go off in search
of the next anti-bourgeois movement that will inspire the next
chapter in their ever-disappointed Perils of Pauline journey.
Perhaps, on the other hand, September 11 will cause more
Americans to come to the stunning and revolutionary conclusion
that we are right to live the way we do, to be the way we are.
Maybe it is now time to put intellectual meat on the bones of
our instinctive pride, to acknowledge that the American way of
life is not only successful, but also character-building. It
inculcates virtues that account for American success: a
certain ability to see problems clearly, to react to setbacks
energetically, to accomplish the essential tasks, to use force
without succumbing to savagery. Perhaps ordinary American life
mobilizes individual initiative, and the highest, not just the
crassest aspirations. Maybe Baudrillard, that infuriatingly
appreciative Frenchman, had it right when he wrote about
America, "We [Europeans] philosophize about a whole host of
things, but it is here that they take shape. . . . It is the
American mode of life, that we judge naive or devoid of
culture, that gives us the completed picture of the object of
our values."
Because the striking thing is that, for all their contempt,
the bourgeoisophobes cannot ignore us. They can't just dismiss
us with a wave and get on with their lives. The entire Arab
world, and much of the rest of the world, is obsessed with
Israel. Many people in many lands define themselves in
opposition to the United States. This is because deep down
they know that we possess a vitality that is impressive. The
Europeans regard us as simplistic cowboys, and in a backhanded
way they are acknowledging the pioneering spirit that
motivates America--the heroic spirit that they, in the comfort
of their welfare states, lack. The Islamic extremists regard
us as lascivious hedonists, and in a backhanded way they are
acknowledging both our freedom and our happiness.
Maybe in their hatred we can better discern our strengths.
Because if the tide of conflict is rising, then we had better
be able to articulate, not least to ourselves, who we are, why
we arouse such passions, and why we are absolutely right to
defend ourselves.
David Brooks is a senior editor at The Weekly Standard. |